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I.

THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Expanding international trade is tying economies of different countries
closer together so that business transactions in one country affect other
countries as well. Such economic interdependence have traditionally given
governments a chance to influence not only their own economies but also
foreign economies by favoring or restricting exports or imports. This
potential influence enlarged significantly as multinational enterprises became
more developed, often putting them in a position to shift goods, materials,
production and earnings from their subsidiary in one country to the
subsidiary or to the mother company in another country, in order to avoid
high taxes, higher wages or stringent environmental laws. By prescribing to
directors of multinational enterprises what they are allowed to do or not do,
a state may exert a powerful economic influence, not only within its own
borders, but also in the countries where the subsidiaries are domiciled.' That
influence may be used by such a state to retain effective control over its own
economy and to prevent the multinational enterprise from escaping the state's
regulatory power. But this regulatory power also may be a means to
influence or even severely hurt the economy of other states and their
individuals, be it for economic or for political reasons, by chance or
intentionally. As far as one state's legislation has an impact on other states,
the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction must be faced.
Through the Cuban Democracy Act, the United States extended the
prohibition of trading with Cuba and almost all trade including "transactions
between U.S.-owned or controlled firms in third countries and Cuba," 2 and

* Professor of law at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat in Frankfurt, Germany.
1. See also A. Vaughan Lowe, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, The British Practice, 52
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 157 (1988).
2. National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1993, § 1706(a)(1) (1993)
(excluding the prior licensing mechanisms under the Cuban Asset Control Regulations).
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thereby expressly extended its regulatory power to firms outside its borders.
This clearly points to the intentional use of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
possibly the borderlines of such jurisdiction.
II.

EUROPEAN PROTEST

Unlike Canada, the European Union (EU) and its member states did not
enact "blocking statutes," 3 but the EC (European Community) and its
member states on October 7, 1992 tried to convince President Bush not to
sign the Cuban Democracy Act. After the enactment on October 23, 1992,
the Commission of the EC officially regretted the Act and mentioned the
possibility of bringing the issue before the GATT or Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Also the European
Parliament on December 19, 1992 passed a resolution asking for the
revocation of the Act. 5 France and Great Britain protested expressly against
the Act and on November 24, 1992 the Assembly of the UN condemned the
Act with the votes of France and Spain, the other EC-member states
abstaining.6
The protest might have confined itself to resolutions and formal protests
because the trade volume at stake between Cuba and the EC amounted
"only" to about 500 million U.S. dollars per year. In a previous similar
conflict concerning the construction of a gas-pipeline from the former Soviet
Union to Western Europe there was much more protest, including a blocking
statute by Great Britain as well as confiscation by the French government of
the goods concerned in order to ship them to Russia
The pipeline embargo case raised much discussion among legal scholars,
with a consensus that the principles of international law did not justify the
use of extraterritorial jurisdiction because the requirements of neither the
principle of universality, the nationality principle, the passive personality
principle nor the protective principle were met. Therefore a Netherlands'
court, the Arrondissementsrechtbank Den Haag, held that the U.S. order
prohibiting exports to Russia may not be considered binding under the laws

3. As to Canada, see Selma G. Lussenburg, Trade with Cuba, 16 CANADIAN L. NEWSL.
5 (Winter 1993).
4. Trade Policy: Bush's Signing of Cuba Embargo Law May Trigger GATT Complaint,
E.C. Warns, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1848 (Oct. 28, 1992).
5. European Parliament Resolution 1993 (C 021) 156.
6. G.A. Res. 47/19, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/47/L.20/Rev.1

(1992).
7. See Hans-J6rg Ziegenhain, 39 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 897, 901
(1993) (specifically dealing with the French situation in Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge,
549 F. Supp 108 (D.C.D.C. 1982).
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of the Netherlands.
The facts before the court were that in 1982, Compagnie Europrenne des
Ptroles S.A. (C.E.P.), a French corporation, had ordered 2400 "strings of
geophones" from Sensor Nederland B.V. for delivery into the former Soviet
Union not later than September 20, 1982. Sensor was a 100% owned
subsidiary of Geosource International, Nederland, which was 100% owned
by Geosource, Inc., a U.S. corporation located in Houston, Texas. Sensor
accepted the offer on June 18, 1982. On July 27, and again on August 12,
1982, Sensor informed C.E.P. that as a subsidiary of a U.S.-corporation
Sensor had to comply with the U.S. President's order from June 22, 1982
prohibiting exports to the Soviet Union and therefore could not deliver on
time.
Following this, C.E.P. applied for an injunction before the Netherland
Court asking for specific performance and damages of 100,000 dutch guilders
for every day of default. Sensor argued that the sanctions under Section
385.2(c) of the U.S. Export Administration Regulation must be considered
as force majeur, and therefore it should not be liable under Article 74 of the
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.
The court did not accept this argument and granted the injunction.9 It
held that Sensor was a Dutch corporation because it was founded in the
Netherlands under the law of the Netherlands and was domiciled in the
Netherlands and that Section 385.2(c) of the U.S. Export Administration
Regulation claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction over Sensor was inconsistent
0
with international law.'
The court based its findings on the principle that a state generally may
not extend its jurisdiction into the territory of another state and the acts
committed there with exceptions only insofar as the nationality principle or
the protective principle applies." As Sensor was a Dutch company, the
nationality principle did not apply. Under the protective principle, according
to the court, a state may extend its jurisdiction over acts which threaten its
safety, its credit rating or other interests of this state wherever and by
whomever these acts are committed. But the court held that the embargo
served only the interest of U.S. foreign policy and that such interests did not
fall under the protective principle."2
As a third exception the court asked whether the exports had immediate
8. See Jigen Basedow, Das Amerikanische Pipeline-Embargovor Gericht Niederlande:
Pres.Rb. Den Haag 17.9 1982 (Az. 82/716), 47 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AuSLANDISHES UND
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 141, 147 (1983) (analyzing Compagnie Europrenne des
P~roles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., 22 Int'l Legal Mat. 66 (Dist. Ct. The Hague 1983)).
9. Id.at 144.
10. Id.at 145.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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and prohibited effects in the territory of the United States, which under
international law would give extraterritorial jurisdiction to the United
States.1 3 Such prohibited effects on the territory of the United States,
however, the court could not find in case of goods not stemming
from the
4
United States and being exported to Russia by a non-U.S. firm.
The court would have approved an extraterritorial measure in a case
where a U.S. citizen had founded a firm outside the United States for the sole
purpose of circumventing the embargo. 5 But as such a case was not before
the court and considering that there was no other connecting link between the
sales contract and the United States, the court held that the U.S. embargo
could not be binding on the contract.' 6 Therefore, Sensor could not rely on
Section 385.2(c) of the Export Regulation Act, but had to comply with the
Dutch law requiring specific performance of the sales contract. 7
III.

GENERAL BALANCING OF INTERESTS

The principles mentioned above are, according to the German understanding, not exclusive, but extraterritorial jurisdiction might also be justified
under a general balancing of the interests involved.' 8 Thereby, the more the
interests of other states are affected, the stronger the ties to the state claiming
extraterritorial jurisdiction must be. On the other hand, the ties to the
regulating state may be looser if this state is pursuing objectives of the
international community. As the U.S. State Department relies on a general
justification of its extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Cuban Democracy Act, 9
it is important to come to a general balancing of interests.
In this context it has to be considered that with the Cuban Democracy
Act, unlike with the pipeline embargo, the U.S. government is striving to
establish democracy in Cuba, which, in general, is an internationally
approved objective. But such an internationally approved objective does not
justify any measures of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Even if it is conceded
that the present situation in Cuba does not comply with democratic standards,
it is doubtful what would come after change. Could a democratic government and a democratic system really be expected to emerge?
Furthermore, the embargo must be a proper means to achieve the
objective intended. This could be contested, too. Because the embargo lacks

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147.

18. Id. at 165; Ziegenhain, supra note 7, at 899.
19. See David H. Small, Managing ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Problems: The United
States Government Approach, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 283, 290-93 (1987).
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international support, Cuba might get all goods needed from other countries.
In addition, it could be argued that a country might be influenced more by
a friend than by an enemy. Therefore, the establishment of friendly and
profitable relations with a country could be more effective in achieving
democratic standards than by using boycott measures. According to German
understanding, many events in history and in recent times, including the fall
of communist governments in the former eastern states, are convincing
examples that cooperation may bring better results than confrontation.
Under a general balancing of interests standard it is useful to keep in
mind that only such means that are less harmful to other nations which are
not a direct goal of the boycott measures can be justified. Considering the
Cuban Democracy Act in this context, by preventing U.S.-owned or
controlled subsidiaries in third countries from trading with Cuba, these third
countries' economies could be seriously and detrimentally affected. The
prohibition of trade will probably reduce the turnover and the earnings of the
subsidiary, which could lead to dismissals, thereby enlarging the unemployment rate in the third state and causing higher social security expenses. At
the same time, because of lower profits, the third state will receive lower tax
revenues causing serious budgetary problems. Also, the trade balance of the
third state could be affected and a serious currency decline might follow.
In order to protect itself, the third state could undertake counter-measures
such as blocking statutes or trade restrictions with the United States. But
such measures would cause a severe detriment to international trade. In
addition, the trade prohibitions imposed by the U.S. government on the
subsidiaries of U.S. firms will force these subsidiaries to breach contracts
already formed. The expected result includes damages as well as a
destruction of the trustworthiness of U.S. firms in international trade.
In addition to the interests of the states, the rights and interests of
individuals should be considered under a general balancing of interests.
Traditionally there has been a strong opinion that only states, and not
individuals, could have rights in international law. 20 According to this
opinion, interests of individuals could hardly be part of the balancing. But
this view which treats individuals only as objects, not as subjects in
international law, seems to be very formal and outdated. It does not comply
with modem thinking which ranks human dignity and human rights as high
values to be protected by all states. Following this, a state claiming
extraterritorial jurisdiction should take into consideration the rights of foreign
individuals which could be infringed upon by extraterritorial measures and,
if such extraterritorial measures are not in conformity with international law,

20. See OTTo KIMMI1CH, EINFOHRUNG IN DAS VOLKERRECHT, 215-20 (1987); JORG
MANFRED MOESSNER, EINFOHRUNG N DAS VOLKERRECHT 93-107 (1977).
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such a state should be liable for damages caused to individuals 21 losing their
jobs or their property because of the exercise of an unjustified extraterritorial
jurisdiction.2 2
These are only some of the possible serious and often unforeseen sideeffects which could arise from such acts as the Cuban Democracy Act, and
they clearly indicate that third countries and individuals could suffer more
from such extraterritorial jurisdiction than the state to which the boycott is
directly aimed. Therefore, the one-sided assumption of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the Cuban Democracy Act cannot be justified by a general
balancing of interests either. Instead of one-sided conflict measures,
cooperation with other countries is the better and probably the more effective
way to achieve democratic results. To strive for democracy in Cuba by
unilaterally imposing unjustified trade restrictions affecting other states and
their individuals is not what democracy stands for.

2 1. See generally Georg Dahm, Die Subsidiarititdes internationalenRechtsschutzes bei
Volkerrechtswidiger Verletzung von Privatpersonen, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR HANS DOLLE 3
(Ernst von Caemrnmerer et al. eds., 1963).
22. Under the exhaustion-of-local-remedies-rule, the individual must first try to recover
his damages before the courts of the unjustified acting state. If such recovery is denied, the
home state of the individual injured should grant him diplomatic protection. See MOESSNER,
supra note 20, at 100.
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